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It is by now well accepted that an arbitrator must be independent 
and impartial with respect to the parties and counsel appearing in a 
case. Many rules and guidelines exist regarding disclosure of the 
arbitrator’s prior exposure to parties and counsel. But what about 
when the arbitrator has prior exposure to a legal or factual issue in the 
case? Where do inclinations towards a particular issue fall on the 
“traffic light” spectrum of acceptable relationships? 
 
* Ina C. Popova is a Partner at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP in New York. The views 
expressed here are the authors’ own and not those of the firm or its clients. All errors are ours 
alone. This article results from remarks given during the Fordham International Arbitration 
Conference in New York on November 17, 2017, under the theme “Facing the Future in 
International Arbitration.” 
** Jessica L. Polebaum is an Associate at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP in New York.  
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The arbitrator’s pre-existing relationship to an issue in dispute in 
the case, and particularly the concern that that relationship may affect 
his or her ability to impartially decide the case, has been described as 
an “issue conflict.” In the wake of such concerns—and against the 
background of several arbitrator disqualifications ostensibly made on 
this basis—in late 2013, the American Society of International Law 
(“ASIL”) and the International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
(“ICCA”) established their first joint task force on the topic of issue 
conflicts in investor-State arbitration (the “Task Force”). After several 
years of research and public consultation, the Task Force issued its 
final report in March 2016.1 
This article summarizes the Task Force’s observations and 
provides an overview of recent developments on the topic, including 
the proposed revision to the Arbitration Rules of the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) and recent 
proposals for codes of conduct for arbitrators. 
II. OBSERVATIONS OF THE ISSUE CONFLICTS TASK FORCE 
In November 2013, at the direction of former ASIL president 
Donald Francis Donovan and then-ICCA president Jan Paulsson, 
ASIL and ICCA assembled a group of experts tasked with evaluating, 
reporting on, and making best-practice recommendations regarding 
issue conflicts in investor-State arbitration. Co-chaired by Professor 
John R. Crook and Professor Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, over 
the course of nearly three years the Task Force collected and 
reviewed cases and literature, created and responded to a detailed 
questionnaire, and led briefings and meetings at ICCA and ASIL-
International Law Association conferences.2 The Task Force 
considered existing guidance, including rules and principles regarding 
jurists’ and lawyers’ ethical obligations,3 permanent international 
 
1. AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION [ASIL-
ICC], REPORT OF THE ASIL-ICCA JOINT TASK FORCE ON ISSUE CONFLICTS IN INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION (2016) [hereinafter ASIL-ICCA REPORT] 
2. Id. ¶ 10. 
3. Namely, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Burgh House 
Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary, Hague Principles on the Ethical 
Standards for Counsel Appearing before International Courts and Tribunals, the ICSID 
Convention and United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
Arbitration Rules, AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, and 
2014 International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration. 
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court and tribunal decisions, and challenge decisions in investor-State 
arbitrations. After holding several working sessions open to the 
public, and in light of comments received on an advance draft, the 
Task Force produced a final report on the state of the field and 
recommendations for future development.4 
The report, published in March 2016, grapples with how to 
appropriately define an “issue conflict.”5 Observing that the term 
“conflict” already presupposes a problem, the Task Force settled on 
the term “inappropriate predisposition” instead.6 It then attempted to 
chart the boundaries of when a predisposition becomes 
“inappropriate.”7 As noted below, that question bears on the nature of 
investor-State arbitration itself. 
A. Overview of Existing Guidance and Practice 
A comparison of existing guidance and practice illustrates a very 
high standard for disqualifying a decision-maker on the grounds of 
prejudgment in the context of standing international tribunals.  For 
example, in the Wall case, a majority of the International Court of 
Justice found that Judge Elaraby’s prior statements, including a 
newspaper interview in which he had expressed criticism of Israel’s 
conduct with respect to the occupation of Palestinian territory and 
atrocities perpetrated on the Palestinian civilian population, did not 
disqualify him from considering the UN General Assembly’s request 
for an advisory opinion on Israel’s construction of a wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory.8 In the Furundzija case, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
rejected a challenge to Judge Mumba on the basis that her association 
with the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women cannot 
be taken to suggest prejudgment in a trial involving the charge of 
aiding and abetting rape.9 The ICTY noted that “her previous 
experience in this area would be relevant to the requirement under 
Article 13(1) of the Statute [of the ICTY] for experience in 
 
4.  ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 10. 
5. Id.  ¶¶ 14-19.  
6. Id. ¶ 18. 
7. Id. ¶¶ 151-68. 
8. Int’l Court of Justice [ICJ], Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Order on Composition of the Court, ¶ 8 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
9. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 
164-168,  197- 205 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 21, 2000). 
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international law” and that “[i]t would be an odd result indeed if the 
operation of an eligibility requirement were to lead to an inference of 
bias.”10 Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
the Special Court of Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal 
Court similarly endorse a high bar for disqualification.11 
Although the written standards of independence and impartiality 
are not substantively different, an arbitrator’s prior exposure to issues 
in the case appears to have prompted heightened concern in 
international arbitration. Existing written rules and guidelines offer 
limited guidance. The International Bar Association Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest recommend disclosing circumstances in which 
the arbitrator “currently serves, or has served within the past three 
years, as arbitrator in another arbitration on a related issue involving 
one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties,”12 as well as 
when an arbitrator has “publicly advocated a position on the case.”13 
Arbitrators need not necessarily disclose, however, instances in which 
they have “previously expressed a legal opinion (such as in a law 
review article or public lecture) concerning an issue that also arises 
in the arbitration (but this opinion is not focused on the case).”14 The 
ICC Guidance Note on conflict disclosures similarly suggests 
disclosure when the arbitrator or his or her law firm “has expressed a 
view on the dispute in a manner that might affect his or her 
impartiality,” without offering guidance on prior expressions of views 
on issues arising in the dispute.15 
In practice, disqualifications on the grounds of prejudgment have 
been rare. Challenges have been made on the basis of prejudgment 
where an arbitrator has (i) addressed an issue in prior academic 
 
10. Id. ¶ 205. 
11. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment on Appeal, ¶¶ 76-80 
(Nov. 28, 2007); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Decision on Motion for 
Voluntary Withdrawal or Disqualification of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson from the RUF 
Case, ¶¶ 8-11 (Jan. 24, 2008); Prosecutor v. Dylio, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on 
the Defence Application of 20 February 2013 for the Disqualification of Judge Sang-Hyun 
Song (June 11, 2013); Prosecutor v. Nourain, Case No. ICC-02/05-03/09, Decision on the 
Defence Request for the Disqualification of a Judge, ¶¶ 12-14 (June 5, 2012).  
12. Int’l Bar Assoc. [IBA], Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest, art. 3.1.5 (2014) 
(emphasis added).  
13. Id. art. 3.5.2 (emphasis added). 
14. Id. art. 4.1.1 (emphasis added). 
15. Int’l Court of Arbitration [ICC], Note to the Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the 
Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitration, ¶ 20 (Oct. 30, 2017) (emphasis 
added).  
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writing or speech;16 (ii) argued or advised on an issue in the role of 
counsel, whether in the past or concurrently (the so-called “double-
hat” scenario);17 (iii) previously been exposed to similar facts;18 or 
(iv) addressed a legal issue in a prior decision or award as an 
arbitrator.19 
More often than not, however, such challenges have failed. The 
Task Force’s research identified only three successful challenges 
ostensibly on the basis, at least in part, of an issue conflict.20 All three 
were decided in a six-month period between September 2013 and 
March 2014.21 
In CC/Devas v. India, Judge Peter Tomka, acting as the 
disqualifying authority, considered whether “on the basis of the prior 
view [expressed by the challenged arbitrators] and any other relevant 
circumstances, that there is an appearance of pre-judgment of an issue 
likely to be relevant to the dispute on which the parties have a 
reasonable expectation of an open mind.”22 He disqualified one of the 
challenged arbitrators on the grounds of his participation in four prior 
 
16. See, e.g., Repsol S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38, Decision 
on the Request for Disqualification of the Majority of the Tribunal (Dec. 13 2013) [hereinafter 
Repsol]; Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on 
Claimants’ Proposal to Disqualify Professor Campbell McLachlan, Arbitrator, ¶52 (Aug. 12, 
2010) [hereinafter Urbaser S.A.].   
17. See, e.g., Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/13, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini from the 
Tribunal under Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, ¶ 61 (Feb. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Saint-
Gobain Performance Plastics].    
18. See, e.g., Participaciones Inversiones Portuarias SÀRL v. Gabonese Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/17, Decision on Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (Nov. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter PIP SÀRL]; İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/24, Decision on Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Professor Philippe Sands, ¶ 74 
(July 11, 2014) [hereinafter İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi].  
19. See Tidewater Inc. et al. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on 
Claimant’s Proposal to Disqualify Professor Brigitte Stern, Arbitrator, ¶ 60 (Dec. 23, 2010); 
see also, İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi, supra note 18,  ¶ 72.  
20.  See ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 118-22, 130-31, 134-35.  
21. See CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Ltd., and 
Telecom Devas Mauritius Ltd. v. Republic of India, PCA Case No. 2013-09, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Challenge to the Hon. Marc Lalonde as Presiding Arbitrator and Prof. Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña as Co-Arbitrator (Sept. 30, 2013) [hereinafter CC/Devas]; Blue Bank Int’l & 
Trust (Barbados) Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/20, 
Decision on the Parties’ Proposals to Disqualify a Majority of the Tribunal (Nov. 12, 2013) 
[hereinafter Blue Bank]; Caratube Int’l Oil Co. LLP & Devincci Salah Hourani v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/13, Decision on the Proposal for Disqualification of Mr. 
Bruno Boesch (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Caratube]. 
22.  CC/Devas, supra note 21, ¶ 58. 
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awards in which the arbitrator had been “confronted with the same 
legal concept in this case arising from the same language on which he 
has already pronounced,” as well as views he had expressed in an 
academic article defending those awards after their annulment.23 
In Blue Bank International & Trust v. Venezuela, the challenged 
arbitrator’s law firm represented an investor in another case against 
the same respondent State, in which it was alleged that similar issues 
were involved.24 In disqualifying the arbitrator, the President of the 
ICSID Administrative Council relied on the commonality of issues in 
both arbitrations.25 He held that “given the similarity of issues likely 
to be discussed in [the other case] and the present case and the fact 
that both cases are ongoing, it is highly probable that [the arbitrator] 
would be in a position to decide issues that are relevant in [the other 
case] if he remained an arbitrator in this case.”26 
Finally, in Caratube v. Kazakhstan, an arbitrator was 
disqualified in light of his previous service on a tribunal that 
dismissed a claim against Kazakhstan, which was based on similar 
facts.27 The unchallenged members of the tribunal held that the 
arbitrator’s participation in the prior award created a risk that “his 
understanding of the situation may well be affected by information 
acquired in the [prior] arbitration” and that as a result the arbitrator 
may “make a determination . . . that could be based on such external 
knowledge.”28 
No challenge has succeeded since Caratube, though parties 
continue to attempt disqualifications. In September 2017, it was 
reported that the two unchallenged arbitrators in TCC v. Pakistan29 
had rejected Pakistan’s proposal to disqualify the claimant-appointed 
arbitrator on the grounds (among other things) that he had acted as 
counsel in another case in which the claimant had used the same 
valuation method as that put forward by the claimant in the pending 
proceeding.30 More recently, in March 2018, it was reported that the 
 
23. Id. ¶¶ 60-65. 
24.  Blue Bank, supra note 21, ¶¶ 66-68. 
25.  Id. ¶ 68. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Caratube, supra note 21, ¶¶ 78-86. 
28. Id. ¶ 89. 
29.  Tethyan Copper Company Pty Limited v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/1.  Debevoise is counsel to the claimant in this arbitration. 
30. Tom Jones, Alexandrov survives Pakistan’s challenge over ‘rare’ damages model, 
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Sept. 8, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1147206/
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two unchallenged arbitrators in an ICSID arbitration against 
Turkmenistan31 rejected a challenge to the claimant-appointed 
arbitrator on the grounds that he had impermissibly prejudged the 
scope of a most-favored-nation clause because he was a member of 
the tribunal in a prior arbitration against Kazakhstan which also 
involved a most-favored-nation clause.32    
B. Task Force Conclusions 
Based on the review of existing guidance and available 
disqualification decisions, the Task Force noted three major 
considerations in deciding challenges to arbitrators on the basis of 
prejudgment: 
1.  Degree of Commitment. The conviction with which the 
view is expressed bears on whether the arbitrator could change 
his or her view in light of the specific circumstances of the 
case.33 Thus, advocating a particular position as counsel on 
behalf of a client is generally not seen as an indication of the 
individual’s unshakable personal conviction.34 Similarly, views 
expressed in academic articles on legal principles generally do 
not foreclose a different application of that principle based on the 
facts of the case at hand.35 One arbitral panel noted, in rejecting a 
challenge based on prior scholarship, that “[o]ne of the main 
qualities of an academic is the ability to change his/her opinion 
as required in light of the current state of academic 
knowledge.”36 
2. Concurrency, Propinquity. While prior professional 
advocacy generally does not indicate a closed mind to the issue, 
concurrent service as an arbitrator and counsel in matters 
 
alexandrov-survives-pakistans-challenge-over-rare-damages-model [https://perma.cc/8YNQ-
87BH] (archived May 7, 2018).  
31. Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/6. 
32. Alison Ross, Hanotiau survives challenge by Turkmenistan, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1166798/hanotiau-survives-
challenge-by-turkmenistan [https://perma.cc/TB48-DACM] (archived May 7, 2018). 
33. ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 161. 
34. Id.; see, e.g., Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, supra note 17; Telekom Malaysia 
Berhad v. Ghana, District Court, The Hague, Challenge No. 17/2004, Petition No. HA/RK 
2004 [hereinafter Telekom Malaysia Berhad].  
35. ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 162; see, e.g., Repsol S.A., supra note 16; but 
see CC/Devas, supra note 21. 
36. Urbaser S.A., supra note 16,¶ 51. 
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involving the same party or that are otherwise related in some 
way is problematic.37 Such concurrence could present an 
immediate conflict or allow for the development of a conflict as 
both proceedings progress.38 
3. Specificity/Proximity to the Current Case. Related to the 
level of commitment with which the view is expressed, the 
specificity of the view expressed and its relationship to the case 
at hand also affect where the line is drawn.39 As noted above, in 
Caratube, an arbitrator was disqualified on the grounds of 
exposure to similar facts in a separate case; in PIP SÀRL, factual 
differences between the related cases were sufficient to overcome 
a challenge based on alleged prejudgment.40 
The Task Force also observed that the concern as to prejudgment 
appears to be more acute for arbitrators in investor-State disputes than 
for members of courts and standing tribunals, reflecting criticisms of 
the legitimacy of the investor-State arbitration framework in 
general.41 As the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council has 
noted, “[t]he international investment arbitration framework would 
cease to be viable if an arbitrator was disqualified simply for having 
 
37. ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶164; see, e.g., Vito Gallo v. Canada, 
UNCITRAL, Challenge Decision (Oct. 14, 2009); Grand River Enterprises v. United States, 
Letter from ICSID Secretary-General Ana Palacio to Professor James Anaya (Nov. 28, 2007). 
38. See Blue Bank, supra note 21, ¶ 68; Telekom Malaysia Berhad, supra note 34; see 
also Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, supra note 17, ¶ 84 (rejecting the challenge before it 
regarding prior service as counsel but recognizing that concurrent service as counsel “can 
potentially raise doubts as to the impartiality and independence of the concerned individual in 
his role as arbitrator. It seems possible that the arbitrator in such a case could take a certain 
position on a certain issue, having in mind that if he took a different position as arbitrator, he 
could undermine his credibility as counsel as [sic] which he is arguing on the same, or very 
similar, issue.”). 
39. ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 166. 
40. PIP SÀRL, supra note 18, ¶¶ 31-35; see also EnCana Corporation v. Republic of 
Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Partial Award on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 43-46 (Feb. 27, 2004); 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. & Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a 
Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, ¶¶ 36-38 (Oct. 22, 2007); İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi, supra 
note 18, ¶¶ 118-25; see also Barton Legum, Investor-State Arbitrator Disqualified for Pre-
Appointment Statements on Challenged Measures, 21 ARB. INT’L 241, 244 (2005) (discussing 
the readiness of the disqualifying authority in Canfor Corp. v. United States to accept a 
challenge based on the previous statements of an arbitrator regarding a measure at issue in the 
arbitration; the arbitrator in question resigned before any decision was published). 
41. ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶¶ 158, 177. 
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faced similar factual or legal issues in other arbitrations.”42 But public 
dialogue surrounding reform of investor-State arbitration frequently 
criticizes the small group of actors and their perceived self-interest in 
deciding cases one way or the other.43 
What makes arbitration different from national court litigation or 
proceedings before international tribunals? One major difference is 
that, in arbitration, the parties can choose their decision-maker.  
Moreover, in arbitration there is no appellate review or binding 
precedent to settle the law and thus rein in the potential impact of any 
one arbitrator’s subjective predisposition towards a particular 
outcome.44 
Both of those elements, however, are fundamental institutional 
features of international arbitration. Party autonomy, in particular, 
entails a certain—albeit not unlimited—freedom to choose an 
arbitrator that one considers appropriate for the case.45 Judging 
whether an arbitrator is appropriate for the case typically involves 
considering, among other things, the candidate’s prior experience 
with, and approach to, the issues in dispute.46 After all, who would 
challenge a decision-maker for staunchly believing in the right to due 
process at all costs? Assessing the role and limits of party autonomy 
in appointing arbitrators therefore entails assessing the role and limits 
of investor-State arbitration itself.47 
Ultimately, the Task Force made three concrete 
recommendations. First, the Task Force counseled that bright-line 
rules are “unnecessary” and “counterproductive.”48 Disqualification 
decisions are ultimately highly fact-specific, and bright-line rules may 
have an unwelcome effect on the development of the field by chilling 
scholarship and discouraging productive interventions by experts in 
the field.49 Second, challenge decisions should be more fully reasoned 
and publicly available.50 Creating an accessible body of decisions will 
 
42. Universal Compression Int’l Holdings, S.L.U. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/9, Decision on the Proposal to Disqualify Prof. Brigitte Stern and 
Prof. Guido Santiago Tawil, Arbitrators, ¶ 83 (May 20, 2011). 
43. See ASIL-ICCA REPORT, supra note 1, ¶ 170 & n.187. 
44. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. 
45.  Id. ¶ 178. 
46.  See id. ¶¶ 121-23. 
47. See id. ¶¶ 177-88. 
48. Id. ¶ 183. 
49. Id. ¶¶ 183-84. 
50. Id. ¶ 185. 
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serve the twin goals of advancing the arbitration community’s 
understanding of the boundaries of impermissible prejudgment and 
enhancing the legitimacy of the investor-State system.51 Publication 
of challenge decisions should foster shared expectations and minimize 
unpredictability for parties, and clear, reasoned conceptualizations of 
prejudgment would help improve perceptions of the investor-State 
framework.52 Finally, the Task Force recognized that there are 
practical challenges regarding the timing of disclosures stemming 
from the fact that, at the time of appointment, there is limited 
information about the issues that might arise in a case.53 The Task 
Force expressed the hope that solutions to these practical difficulties 
could be considered as the contours of inappropriate prejudgment 
become more defined through practice.54 
III. RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS 
Since publication of the Task Force report, there have been 
several initiatives to define the proper approach to the perceived 
problem of issue conflicts, including through codes of conduct for 
arbitrators and other institutional guidelines. These initiatives reflect 
varying degrees of institutionalization, and attract varying degrees of 
support. We consider three proposals below: (i) ICSID’s 
announcement of a revision to its Arbitration Rules that might include 
an arbitrator code of conduct, (ii) the European Commission’s 
continued pursuit of a standing investment court to replace investor-
State arbitration, and (iii) various proposals made to reform arbitrator 
ethical standards. 
A. ICSID Rules Revision 
In October 2016, ICSID announced that it would commence 
consultations with Member States on revisions to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and invited Member States to suggest topics worthy 
 
51.  Id. 
52. Id. ¶¶ 185-88. 
53.  Id. ¶ 189. 
54. Id. 
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of consideration.55 That invitation was extended to the broader public 
of interested stakeholders in January 2017.56 
A code of conduct for arbitrators was one of the main topics of 
suggested reform.57 ICSID noted: 
Code of Conduct for Arbitrators: the ICSID rules currently 
require a declaration that an arbitrator meets the required 
qualifications in the Convention, however some recent treaties 
have included more elaborated codes of conduct outlining 
expectations. This could be incorporated in the ICSID process.58 
Currently, there is no comprehensive code of conduct governing 
ICSID arbitrators or the treatment of potential issue conflicts. Article 
14(1) of the ICSID Convention dictates that arbitrators must be 
“persons . . . who may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment.”59 At the outset of all ICSID proceedings, each arbitrator 
must sign a declaration “to judge fairly as between the parties” and 
append a description of past and present professional and other 
relationships with the parties, as well as “any other circumstance that 
might cause [his or her] reliability for independent judgment to be 
questioned by a party.”60 An arbitrator may be disqualified where he 
or she shows a “manifest lack of the qualities required by paragraph 
(1) of Article 14” of the Convention.61 This standard is at least 
facially different from that in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
which adopts a standard of “justifiable doubt” as to the arbitrator’s 
independence and impartiality.62 
 
55. ICSID, Amendment of ICSID’s Rules and Regulations, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
en/Pages/about/Amendment-of-ICSID-Rules-and-Regulations.aspx [https://perma.cc/T22W-
8TGX] (archived May 7, 2018). 
56. Id.  
57. ICSID, List of Topics for Potential ICSID Rule Amendment (Feb. 2017), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/List%20of%20Topics%20for%20Potential%2
0ICSID%20Rule%20Amendment-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2DX-DKUG] (archived May 7, 
2018); ICSID, The ICSID Rules Amendment Process (Apr. 2017), at 2, https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/documents/about/icsid%20rules%20amendment%20process-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PK8Z-BL7T] (archived May 7, 2018) [hereinafter ICSID Rules Amendment 
Process].   
58. See ICSID Rules Amendment Process, supra note 57, at 2.  
59. Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], Convention art. 14(1) 
(2006).  
60. ICSID Arbitration Rule 6(2). 
61. ICSID Convention art. 57. 
62. See LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, Potential rule amendments or improvements to 
the arbitration and conciliation procedures of ICSID, in ICSID, PUBLIC COMMENTS TO 
AMENDMENT OF ICSID’S RULES AND REGULATIONS ¶ 10 (2016-2018) [hereinafter LAW 
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ICSID’s background paper on the topic of codes of conduct has 
not yet been released, although it is expected in 2018.63 Public 
comments on potential areas for revision have expressed a range of 
viewpoints on a potential ICSID code of arbitrator conduct. For 
example, the Law Council of Australia has noted that “clearer 
guidelines” are needed to “minimize the persistence of [the double-
hat] trend” in order to bolster ICSID’s legitimacy.64 In its public 
comments, Baker & McKenzie echoed that sentiment and suggested 
the stipulation of “a certain period of grace during which arbitrators 
cannot act as counsel.”65 Noting that under the current ICSID rules, 
the “guarantees of independence and impartiality are inadequate,” the 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment provided that the revised 
rules should preclude entirely the practice of simultaneous service as 
an arbitrator and counsel in investor-state arbitral disputes.66 Several 
commenters also noted that arbitrator challenges should not be heard 
by the unchallenged arbitrators, but rather by ICSID itself.67 ICSID is 
expected to publish a Working Paper on Proposed Amendments in 
time for consideration at a September 2018 meeting of Member State 
representatives.68 
B. Standing Investment Tribunals 
Over the past several years, the European Commission (the 
“EC”) has reacted to criticisms of the legitimacy of investor-State 
 
COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, Potential Rule Amendments or Improvements], 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/about/Public%20Comments%20to%20Amendment
%20to%20ICSID%20Rules%20and%20Regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZVJ-9XYR] 
(archived May 7, 2018); Claudiu-Paul Buglea, Potential Amendments to ICSID Rules and 
Regulations, in ICSID, PUBLIC COMMENTS TO AMENDMENT OF ICSID’S RULES AND 
REGULATIONS ¶ 2.1 (2016-2018). 
63. ISCID, Next Steps in the Rules Amendment Process, https://icsid.worldbank.org
/en/Pages/resources/ICSID%20NewsLetter/2017-Issue4/Next-Steps-in-the-Rules-Amendment-
Process.aspx [https://perma.cc/8YN7-GT4Z] (archived May 7, 2018) [hereinafter ICSID, Next 
Steps].   
64.  LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA, Potential Rule Amendments or Improvements, supra 
note 62, ¶ 11. 
65. BAKER & MCKENZIE, Submissions to the ICSID Secretariat on revisions to the 
ICSID Rules and Regulations, in ICSID, PUBLIC COMMENTS TO AMENDMENT OF ICSID’S 
RULES AND REGULATIONS ¶1.32.  
66. COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, Illustrative Suggestions for 
Amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, in ICSID, PUBLIC COMMENTS TO AMENDMENT 
OF ICSID’S RULES AND REGULATIONS 5.  
67. Id.; Buglea, supra note 62, ¶ 2.2. 
68. ICSID, Next Steps, supra note 63.   
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arbitration by advocating for codes of conduct for arbitrators and for 
replacing the investor-State dispute settlement system with a standing 
investment court.69 The EC has implemented these goals in the 
European Union’s trade agreement with Canada (“CETA”), which 
was ratified by Canada in May 2017, and with Vietnam, which is in 
the process of being ratified, as well as in the EC’s proposal for a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.70 Through the 
establishment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and 
standards, these instruments address certain (but not all) aspects of the 
prejudgment concern. All three prohibit concurrent service as 
arbitrator and counsel: they provide that arbitrators “shall refrain from 
acting as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any 
pending or new investment protection dispute under this or any other 
agreement or domestic law.”71 They also contain codes of conduct for 
arbitrators. These codes of conduct include general language 
requiring arbitrators to be “independent and impartial”72 and to 
disclose relationships or matters likely to affect an arbitrator’s 
independence or impartiality or that might create an appearance of 
impropriety or bias.73 
CETA goes several steps further: it imposes explicit disclosure 
obligations requiring potential arbitrators to disclose “public 
advocacy or legal or other representation concerning an issue in 
dispute in the proceeding or involving the same matters.”74 CETA 
 
69. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission proposes new Investment Court 
System for TTIP and other EU trade and investment negotiations (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5651_en.htm [https://perma.cc/2Q7Z-SYXM] 
(archived May 7, 2018). 
70. See, e.g., European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 
c. 8, § F (Oct. 30, 2016) [hereinafter CETA Code of Conduct] (regarding a standing 
investment tribunal and a future multilateral investment court system); European Union-
Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, c. 8, § 4 (Feb. 1, 2016) [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA Code 
of Conduct] (regarding a standing investment tribunal and a future multilateral investment 
court system); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership EU Proposal, c II, § 4 (Nov. 
12, 2015) [hereinafter Proposed TTIP Code of Conduct] (regarding a standing investment 
tribunal and a future multilateral investment court system).   
  71.  Proposed TTIP Code of Conduct, supra note 70, c. II, § 2, art. 11(1); EU-
Vietnam FTA Code of Conduct, supra note 70, c. 8, § 3, art. 14(1); CETA Code of Conduct, 
supra note 70, c. 8, § F, art. 8.30(1). 
72. Proposed TTIP Code of Conduct, supra note 70, c. II, § 2, Annex II; EU-Vietnam 
FTA Code of Conduct, supra note 70, c. 8, §  3. Annex II; CETA Code of Conduct, supra note 
70, c. 8, § F, Annex 29-B. 
73.  Proposed TTIP Code of Conduct, supra note 70, art. 3(1); EU-Vietnam FTA Code 
of Conduct, supra note 70, art. 3(1); CETA Code of Conduct, supra note 70, art. 3(1). 
74. CETA Code of Conduct, supra note 70, art. 4(4). 
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entered into force provisionally in September 2017, although it will 
not fully apply until it has been ratified by all Member States.75 
In November 2017, the EC announced that it would pursue the 
establishment of a permanent multilateral investment court system.76 
The court would be composed of a tribunal of first instance and of 
appeal; members of the court would be appointed to fixed, long, and 
non-renewable terms.77 This institutionalization project aims to 
address, in part, concerns about the pernicious effects of party 
appointment of the decision-maker, but with the attendant 
consequences for the principle of party autonomy. 
C. Ethics Regulation Proposals 
Several suggestions for ethics regulation for arbitrators emerged 
in late 2016. Although these proposals do not specifically address it, 
they form part of the same current of institutionalization confronting 
the perceived problem of issue conflicts. 
In October 2016, the Swiss Arbitration Association’s (“ASA”) 
working group on counsel ethics—whose mandate included 
considering arbitrator impartiality and independence—scrapped a 
previous proposal for a global ethics council.78 The idea of a 
transnational body tasked with applying and enforcing ethical 
principles, with “the main [though not exclusive] power to apply rules 
of professional ethics that it deems relevant and applicable,” had been 
suggested by the ASA’s President in 2014.79 The ASA’s working 
 
75. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU-Canada trade agreement enters into force, http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1723 [https://perma.cc/T3QG-BZC5] (archived 
May 7, 2018). 
76. See European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision, authorizing the 
opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for the settlement of 
investment disputes, Sept. 13, 2017, COM(2017) 493, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/
rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-493-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF [https://perma.cc/KPE3-YLDQ] 
(archived May 7, 2018).  
77. European Commission, Annex to the Recommendation for a Council Decision, 
authorizing the opening of negotiations for a Convention establishing a multilateral court for 
the settlement of investment disputes, ¶ 9, Sept. 13, 2017, COM(2017) 493, http://
ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-493-F1-EN-ANNEX-1-PART-
1.PDF [https://perma.cc/6HEC-7KL9] (archived May 7, 2018).  
78. ASA, ASA Working Group on Counsel Ethics Releases Latest Findings (Oct. 3, 
2016), http://www.arbitration-ch.org/en/asa/asa-news/details/993.asa-working-group-on-
counsel-ethics-releases-latest-findings.html [https://perma.cc/VJ7K-XTCL] (archived May 7, 
2018). 
79. Elliot Geisinger, President’s Message: Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration – 
Could One Take Things a Step Further?, 32 ASA BULL. 453, 455 (2014). 
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group deemed the extra-institutional structure to be premature, though 
not definitively unnecessary.80 
One month after the ASA’s findings were announced, Singapore 
Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon proposed that the Chartered Institute 
of Arbitrators (“CIArb”) hear challenges to arbitrators in proceedings 
administered by other institutions.81 Justice Menon argued that, 
because CIArb has “devoted considerable attention to the 
development of best practices,” it can build on existing disciplinary 
procedures to self-regulate the arbitration community.82 This “robust 
and independent disciplinary process” would, in his view, “enhance 
the legitimacy of arbitration as a whole.”83 Under Justice Menon’s 
proposal, an ethics complaint against an arbitrator would first be 
raised with the relevant arbitral institution, then referred to CIArb, 
which could elect to begin disciplinary proceedings.84 CIArb’s 
intervention would be limited to cases of egregious ethical breach.85 
Disciplinary proceedings would be heard by arbitrators selected from 
a list maintained by CIArb.86 The process would be written into the 
rules of the respective arbitral institutions, and CIArb’s disciplinary 
decisions “would be published and notified to other arbitral 
institutions enrolled in the scheme.”87 Sanctions could include 
removal of the arbitrator from the list of the administering institution 
or from CIArb.88 
Justice Menon’s proposal has not yet been followed by concrete 
steps to implement such self-regulation. In October 2017, the 
President of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, Alexis 
Mourre, argued that no separate ethics body is necessary or advisable: 
rather, institutions can police arbitrators and arbitrators can police 
counsel, both according to existing institutional guidelines and best 
 
80. Id. 
81. Sundaresh Menon, Adjudicator, Advocate, or Something in Between? Coming to 
Terms with the Role of the Party-appointed Arbitrator, 34 J. OF INT’L ARB. 347, 369 (2017). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 370-71. 
84. Id. at 370. 
85. Alison Ross, Tribunals and institutions can monitor ethics, argues Mourre, GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. (Oct. 9, 2017), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1148684/tribunals-and-
institutions-can-monitor-ethics-argues-mourre [https://perma.cc/WGZ5-ANHF] (archived May 
7, 2018) (describing new elements of the proposal as reported by former CIArb president 
Doug Jones). 
86. Menon, supra note 82, at 370. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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practices.89 A third supervisory authority would be in no better a 
position to judge ethical challenges than the relevant arbitral 
institution.90 Moreover, Mourre argued, disciplinary proceedings 
could be misused for tactical ends.91 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“Integrity has no need of rules.” 
—Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus 
 
Suggestions for the reform of arbitrator duties prompt valuable 
discussion of the nature of international arbitration itself. What do we 
expect from arbitrators? What can we tolerate, and to what do we 
aspire? What value and limits do we place on party autonomy, 
academic freedom, consistency in outcomes? How do we balance the 
appearance of an open mind with the preference for certainty as to an 
arbitrator’s approach, and the reality that experienced decision-
makers will have preconceived (and not necessarily problematic) 
notions of what the law is and should be? 
The voices for institutional reform may eventually converge on a 
consensual approach. In the meantime, however, the existing general 
standards of independence and impartiality are expansive enough to 
cover alleged prejudgment of legal or factual issues. On this, as on 
other issues, the arbitration community as a whole will no doubt 
ultimately generate best practices through healthy debate, rigorous 
analysis, and seasoned practice. 
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